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Abstract 
 
The privatization idea may have lost some of its luster in recent years, but it remains 
relevant in today’s socio-economic environment and is pursued consistently in 
industrialized and industrializing countries alike.  Hong Kong has followed the 
general pattern in a manner reflecting its particular circumstances and its institutional 
modus operandi.  The underlying logic may not appear highly compelling, from a 
short-term perspective, yet there are sound grounds for approaching the task 
positively, if viewed from a multi-year standpoint.  Rather surprisingly, for such a 
quintessentially capitalist society, Hong Kong has not confronted the privatization 
challenge astutely on the political front and has handled it somewhat mechanically in 
managerial terms.  The benefits to the community may have thus been more modest 
than one could legitimately expect, given the historical backdrop. 
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THE TRANSFER OF PROPERTY RIGHTS FROM THE PUBLIC 
TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN HONG KONG: 
A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Hong Kong possesses a number of politico-economic attributes that qualify as rather 
unique, whether in theory or practice.  Perhaps the most noteworthy is its status as a 
Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China (HKSAR), 
functioning comfortably as an autonomous capitalist enclave on the periphery of a 
vast country presided over by a Communist Party that operates in an increasingly 
benign fashion but is by no means ready to abandon authoritarian rule.  While initially 
unnerved by the departure of the colonial administration, rooted in British democratic 
soil, and the resumption of Chinese sovereignty, the territory has subsequently 
recovered its composure and is currently flourishing as an international/ regional/ 
China-focused intermediation center, albeit at times unevenly so and without 
suppressing altogether long-term anxieties (Meyer 2000). 
 
Another salient characteristic that distinguishes Hong Kong fundamentally from most 
industrialized countries and equivalent is the deliberate restraint exercised by the 
government in the economic sphere.  This posture has led, according to an ardent 
supporter of local policy practices, to an institutional configuration allowing private 
agents to be guided in a highly effective fashion by a system aptly designated as an 
“automatic corrective mechanism.”  The latter is portrayed as a process firmly 
anchored in an essentially free market economy that continuously alters internal costs 
and prices to bring them quickly into line with costs and prices in the rest of the 
world.  The flexible movement of internal costs and prices, with associated changes in 
output and employment, brings about internal and external equilibrium at all levels of 
world trade, and maximum economic growth (Rabushka 1973; Rabushka 1976; 
Rabushka 1979; de Mesquita, Newman, and Rabushka, 1985; de Mesquita, Newman, 
and Rabushka 1996).  This disciplined policy setting has been succinctly delineated 
by the author extolling the virtues of the model: 
 
In Hong Kong, economic affairs are conducted in an environment of almost 
unfettered free enterprise.  Government policy has long dictated a virtually 
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hands-off approach toward the private sector, an approach that seems well 
suited to Hong Kong’s exposed and dependent economic and political 
situation.  The philosophy that underlies government in Hong Kong can be 
summed up in a few short phrases:  law and order, minimum interference in 
private affairs, and the creation of an environment conducive to profitable 
investment.  Regulatory economic controls are held to a minimum, no 
restrictions are placed on the movement of capital, little protection and few 
subsidies are given to industry, and the few direct services provided by the 
government are operated on a commercial basis (Rabushka 1979: 44).  
 
And the adaptability and dynamism that the policy gives rise to have been neatly 
captured by another scholar: 
 
The government asserts that the Hong Kong economy is a self-regulating one:  
it is the classical economists’ dream.  There is therefore no need for the 
government to intervene.  The essence of the argument is that nowhere else in 
the world is the wage/price flexibility so high as it is in Hong Kong.  When a 
recession occurs, either from a fall in world trade or a decline in the 
construction industry, output and employment will fall as in the case of a 
recession in other countries.  But, unlike other countries, the response of the 
Hong Kong economy to such a fall in employment and output will be fast.  
Such a response takes the form of a decrease in real wages followed by a 
decrease in prices, as predicted in the classical macroeconomic model.  As 
most of our manufactured goods are for export, the fall in prices will make our 
products more competitive in overseas markets.  In this way, our exports and 
manufacturing output can be stimulated through this automatic mechanism.  
Moreover, it can also be argued that the fall in prices and wages will have the 
effect of increasing the real cash balance (i.e., the cash in the hands of the 
public in terms of constant prices).  Any increase in the real cash balance will 
tend to make people feel richer than before and, in consequence, consumption 
will be stimulated and the recovery from a recession will be initiated (Chen 
1984: 40). 
 
 
This spirited depiction of the policy thrust and its impact on system-wide performance 
has not gone unchallenged.  Mildly dissenting views have been offered periodically, 
highlighting selectively the descriptive limitations of the picture constructed and its 
normative connotations.  The reservations expressed by writers focusing on the 
normative side initially reflected Keynesian-style and broader liberal concerns about 
the implications of such a distinctly non-interventionist government stance and heavy 
reliance on market forces.  It was argued that macroeconomic stabilization should be 
pursued with greater determination, where appropriate, and that strategies should be 
implemented, in a sensible fashion, to address micro-level market failure and 
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economic deprivation/ inequality (Cheng 1982; Chen 1984; Peebles 1988; Ho and 
Chau 1989). 
 
The somewhat critical observations offered regarding the descriptive side have 
highlighted the divergences between the “ideal” – perhaps even to a certain extent 
ideologically-inspired – model and prevailing realities, albeit without overstating the 
broad implications of any such divergences.  In the early stages of the evolution of the 
“debate” on the role of the government in the economy, students of the Hong Kong 
scene not firmly attached to laissez-faire principles sought to establish, at least in 
general terms, that the local authorities did not always follow practices entirely 
consistent with their own stated strategic tenets or operate at all times in a manner 
often attributed to them admiringly by others.  Specifically, it was pointed out that the 
government did not adopt an unambiguously passive posture but had explicitly 
pursued a policy of “positive non-interventionism,” endeavoring to enhance the 
working of market forces and taking complementary actions when necessary (Cheng 
1982; Youngson 1982).  This moderately revisionist fine-tuning did not culminate in 
any radical conclusions, yet the emphasis shifted from absolute values to relative 
ones: 
 
One may, of course, quibble and complain that this is a weak and defective 
laissez-faire, since it has been contaminated by some concerns of present-day 
welfare.  On the other hand, it is still as close to the real thing as one can 
come.  If Hong Kong no longer boasts as much freedom as 18
th
 century 
England or the free-wheeling days of 19
th
 century Shanghai, it is still a far 
throw from the mixed economies of the West today, let alone socialist or 
communist regimes.  Let us say it is early 20
th
 century laissez-faire, although 
its critics might dispute the fact that it has got so far.  In some ways, it is even 
an improved form, as compared with the more spontaneous laissez-faire of 
earlier times, for the Hong Kong Government is following the policy 
consciously and purposefully, taking advantage of the benefits it does offer.  
But all that does not really matter.  If one wishes to find a well-preserved and 
healthy specimen of an otherwise vanishing species, there is no other place to 
see and study laissez-faire than Hong Kong (Woronoff 1980: 41). 
 
This re-adjustment of the analytical lens, to reflect the uniqueness of an institutional 
pattern compared to those witnessed elsewhere rather than its intrinsic merits, was 
appropriate and well-timed.  Nevertheless, it was undertaken at a juncture preceding 
the emergence of a series of exogenous shocks that have resulted in greater 
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government activism at the margin (the influx of immigrants from the mainland, 
induced by communist rule and Maoist excesses, materialized earlier and provided the 
catalyst for large-scale public sector supply of housing services).  The prospect of 
British departure and resumption of sovereignty by China, the extreme currency 
volatility that ensued, leading to the establishment of the “linked exchange rate 
system”; the prolonged property market bust that crippled domestic demand from the 
late 1990’s to the middle of this decade; the global recession that followed the 2001 
equity market collapse; and recurring severe environmental hazards (notably, bird flu 
and severe acute respiratory syndrome) have compelled the government to adopt 
counter-cyclical and regulatory measures exceeding the historical norm. 
 
The effects of exogenous shocks do not necessarily dissipate over time.  As argued 
and demonstrated by Peacock and Wiseman (1961), they may become entrenched 
and, inter alia, affect the long-term balance between the private sector and its public 
counterpart.  The increase in government size witnessed in the past decade or so may 
partly be explained by invoking their theoretical framework.  It may arguably also 
reflect processes encapsulated in “Wagner’s Law,” which posits that public 
expenditure is highly elastic with respect to national income (Bird 1971).  Hong 
Kong’s growing affluence may have thus contributed to government expansion.  Last 
but not least, it is possible to hypothesize, along the lines suggested by Baumol 
(1967), that healthy productivity gains seen in the private domain, in an environment 
characterized by rapid structural transformation (Sung 1991; Sung 2002), may have 
boosted the relative share of the economic pie of the inherently less efficient public 
sector. 
 
It should be emphasized that, at around 20% of gross domestic product, this share 
remains distinctly modest by international standards.  From a comparative 
perspective, Hong Kong continues to stand out as an externally open and internally 
unshackled economic entity, whose government does not make substantial claims on 
societal resources (Peebles 1988; Ho and Chau 1989; Mushkat 1990; Lethbridge and 
Ng 2000).  Nevertheless, the persistent rise in public spending, particularly during a 
period characterized by moderate private sector activity, and government propensity 
to broaden its role both generally and in specific policy areas have prompted an 
analytical re-orientation away from “excessive” bureaucratic restraint in the face of 
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macro and micro strains toward “overzealousness” in seeking to solve 
problems/capitalize on opportunities and the lack of discipline exhibited in the 
process.  This new trend has been reinforced by concerns about potentially chronic 
fiscal deficits, serious challenges posed by aging, and possible post-1997 erosion of 
commitment to the strict management principles espoused by the colonial 
administration (Lethbridge and Ng 2000; Ash et al. 2003). 
 
The corollary is that the phenomenon of “government failure” and potential responses 
thereto have begun to feature, in one form or another, more prominently in the policy 
literature than the inefficiencies/inequities that manifest themselves in the private 
marketplace and the public remedies assumed to be necessary to alleviate them (Scott 
and Burns 1988; Cheek-Milby 1995; Scott 2000; Lo 2002; Mushkat and Mushkat 
2003; Mushkat and Mushkat 2004; Mushkat and Mushkat 2005a; Mushkat and 
Mushkat 2005b; Mushkat and Mushkat 2005c; Scott 2005).  The latter have not 
receded completely into the background because Hong Kong is confronting a number 
of very serious environmental challenges.  Air pollution is at critical levels, seldom 
seen in countries/large metropolitan areas in the industrialized world.  And bird flu 
constitutes a latent threat of unthinkable proportions, capable of inflicting massive 
damage on the territory’s socio-economic fabric.  Notwithstanding the severity of 
such problems, policy analysts are increasingly gravitating toward symptoms of 
malfunctioning in the public sector.  This is consistent with the pattern observed in 
mature democracies and post-authoritarian industrializing countries in the past two 
decades or so. 
 
The government itself is acutely aware of the need to shrink its size due to the 
uncertain long-term business outlook, implications of demographic stagnation, 
fragility of the tax system, constraints imposed by the constitution/Basic Law and 
linked exchange rate system, ramifications of political reforms (however gradual), and 
pressures emanating from the grass roots.  It seems to have embraced privatization as 
a strategic goal, albeit subject to various qualifications, and has been progressing 
toward this goal, although by no means in a determined fashion.  Independent policy 
analysts, particularly those with neoclassical economic leanings (the local equivalent 
of the “Chicago School”), have both encouraged and endorsed the move.  The 
purpose of this paper is to offer some broad insights into the privatization process in 
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Hong Kong ,  place it in the appropriate theoretical context, and highlight its possible 
shortcomings. 
 
Overview and Evaluation 
 
The impression is that Hong Kong has a rather crowded privatization agenda.  The 
underground rail network (Mass Transit Railway Corporation; MTRC) has been 
partially privatized with considerable fanfare and the (fully corporatized) overground 
rail network (Kowloon-Canton Railway Corporation; KCRC) is expected to be 
absorbed into it before long.  There has also been selective privatization and 
commercialization of public housing in the territory.  Two other initiatives worth 
highlighting are the establishment of the Hospital Authority (HA), an “independent” 
organization responsible for managing all public hospitals in the territory (it remains 
formally accountable to the government through the Secretary for Health and 
Welfare), and the Electrical and Mechanical Services Trading Fund, an entity which 
operates as an integral part of the bureaucratic machinery but on a commercial basis 
(this qualifies as a variant of “contracting in,” as distinct from “contracting out”). 
 
The Water Supplies Department, International Airport, Post Office (known as Hong 
Kong Post) are high-profile candidates for privatization at some future juncture.  In 
fact, the airport already functions along the lines of the public hospital system by 
virtue of being overseen by a body (the Airport Authority; AA) structured in a similar 
manner to the HA.  Given this configuration, it is likely to be privatized much earlier 
than the other two arms of the government apparently destined to be ultimately 
decoupled from the public sector.  It should also be noted that the government has 
liberalized a number of key industries, most notably the telecommunications sector.  
While this does not necessarily amount to “privatization” in local terms, the 
distinction is often blurred in the international academic/professional literature.  There 
has been a clamor in independent policy circles for broadening the deepening the 
process (Kwong 1988; Kwon 1990; Mueller 1991; Hall 1996; Cheng and Wong 1997; 
Ho 1997; Lam 1997; Lam and Chan 1997; Cheng and Wu 1998; Wong 1998; Lam 
and Chan 2000; Jao 2001). 
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Although privatization has been pursued with a degree of consistency, across a 
potentially wide organizational spectrum, it is necessary to draw a clear distinction in 
this context between strategic intentions, which are not entirely transparent and yet 
can tentatively be ascertained, and policy realities, as observed on the ground.  
Whatever the ultimate vision, in practice privatization has evolved at a leisurely pace 
and in a piecemeal fashion.  The program has not been driven with a great sense of 
determination and the steps taken do not seem to have been closely interconnected.  
The record to date is rather modest insofar as the scope of the endeavor is concerned 
and the consequent changes in the institutional infrastructure.  Hong Kong has no 
compelling reason to opt for New Zealand-style radical surgery, but it has apparently 
chosen to address the task cautiously and pragmatically, rather than boldly and 
comprehensively. 
 
With the possible exception of housing (Brewer and La Grange, 2001), privatization 
also cannot be said to have emerged as an issue that commands much public attention 
and is constantly propelled into the center of the political arena.  Social scientists 
differentiate between “systematic” and “governmental” agendas.  The former consist 
of matters acknowledged by members of the community as relevant and meriting an 
appropriate response on the part of the public authorities.  The latter refer to problems 
that are recognized by government officials (including legislators) as such.  
Systematic agendas normally “percolate” in society, waiting to be elevated to “active” 
status (Cobb and Elder 1983).  Privatization in Hong Kong has not followed that 
route.  It has been embraced by the bureaucracy, albeit not unambiguously, without 
first gaining shape in “noninstitutional” settings. 
 
This pattern does not correspond to the “pluralist” model of public agenda setting, 
which assumes that power rests with mobilized citizen groups (Cobb and Elder 1983).  
Rather, it displays features associated with the “elitist” model, whose proponents 
argue that power is concentrated in the hands of the few.  The latter wield authority 
over a multitude lacking ready access to the corridors of power.  The political 
structure resembles a pyramid, with authority flowing from the top to the bottom, not 
the other way around (Dye and Ziegler 1981). The elitist model may be broadened 
and rendered more flexible by drawing a distinction between administrative (i.e. 
bureaucratic) and political (i.e., legislative) elites, as well as allowing for an input 
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from special interests, as the “subgovernmental” model (Carter 1965).  It may offer a 
more accurate picture of the privatization process in Hong Kong, provided no strong 
emphasis is placed on the role of legislators (Cheek-Milby 1995). 
 
There is no evidence of a concerted effort to seriously engage the public, or segments 
thereof, in a dialogue regarding the transfer of assets to the private sector.  The 
government has an elaborate information management system and employs it in a 
reasonably effective fashion.  Policy initiatives are generally signaled in advance and 
adequate transparency is maintained throughout the exercise.  However, this is not 
necessarily equivalent to educating the public consistently and thoroughly.  Nor does 
it suggest that measures are taken to widen the decision-making circle and encourage 
two-way communication flows.  This is a subject where technical factors inevitably 
overshadow strategic/ qualitative ones.  Nevertheless, in most industrialized countries/ 
affluent metropolitan areas, it has been tackled in a somewhat less elitist/ 
subgovernmental manner.  Again, New Zealand stands out in this respect (Bollard and 
Buckle 1987; Easton 1989; Holland and Boston 1990; Boston 1991; Bollard 1992; 
Clarke and Pitelis 1993; Anderson and Hill 1996). 
 
Privatization is a broad and elastic concept.  It may be defined as “the shifting of a 
function, either in whole or in part, from the public sector to the private sector (Butler 
1991:17).  As such, “it involves the increased reliance on private actors and market 
forces to take over…responsibilities that had in recent decades come to be regarded as 
properly within the governmental sphere (Feigenbaum, Henig, and Hamnett 1999:1).  
Definitions of this nature are relied upon to convey the essence of the phenomenon, 
and are thus helpful, but they do not fully capture its complexity.  Privatization has 
evolved over time into a truly multi-dimensional process whose scope cannot easily 
be delineated in conventional terms.  According to Fiegenbaum, Henig, and Hamnett 
(1999), for example, it has decision-making, delivery, financing, and responsibility 
aspects. 
 
This flexible approach recasts privatization as a continuum or, better still, as a concept 
whose various dimensions may be given more effective expression through finely-
honed typologies than simple statements.  The delivery and financing aspects, in 
particular, come into play in contemporary settings in a way that allows policy 
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analysts to generate a greater number of institutional scenarios than traditional 
definitions can accommodate.  The point is that service delivery and financing need 
not be both either through public or private sector channels.  The service may be 
delivered by a private entity (the provider) but financed by a public one (the payer) or 
vice versa.  In fact, four permutations are possible (Table 1).  Privatization may thus 
feature a shift from public delivery of publicly financed services to private delivery of 
privately financed ones (“wholesale” privatization).  However, the term may also 
encompass less “ambitious” undertakings such as “contracting out,” voucher-type 
schemes (quadrant 2) and configurations involving private financing of publicly 
delivered services via user charges (quadrant 3). 
 
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
 
Indeed, it is arguable that the definition may be stretched ever further.  Specifically, in 
the academic/professional literature privatization is increasingly equated with 
liberalization (Ott and Hartley 1991; Adam, Cavendish, and Mistry 1992; Bailey 
1995; Bailey 1999; Dollery and Wallis 2001; Bailey 2004).  The corollary is that 
virtually any structural initiative designed to enhance efficiency by loosening market 
forms/unleashing competitive pressures might qualify as privatization of one sort or 
another (Table 2).  This would include “in-house”/public sector-specific “competitive 
tendering,” “contracting in” and the like.  It is debatable whether privatization is a 
subset of liberalization or whether the distinction between the two processes is 
blurred.  Whichever is the case, it is evident that, in confronting organizational 
realities, one cannot overemphasize the differences. 
 
(Insert Table 2 about here) 
 
In Hong Kong, privatization is largely identified with a complete structural overhaul, 
or the transfer of public assets which are exclusively managed by the government on a 
mostly non-commercial basis to a private company which assumes ownership and 
exercises control over operations.  The transition from one state to the other often 
takes the form of a two-step process, with corporatization preceding privatization but, 
broadly-speaking, this is the general pattern.  Vouchers receive scant attention and 
even user charges do not loom large on the policy agenda.  Contracting out is also not 
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pursued with great vigor.  The strategy is thus characterized by a rather narrow focus 
and traditional-style problem conceptualization. 
 
One qualification may be in order in this context.  To the extent that certain types of 
private infrastructure development and operation may be considered as a variant of 
contracting out, the activity is by no means relegated to the periphery, at least in the 
theoretical – as distinct from practical – sense of the term (“Build-Operate-Transfer”/ 
“BOT” denotes that the private sector designs, finances, builds, and operates the 
facility over the life of the contract; at the end of this period, ownership reverts to the 
government; an alternative arrangement is the “Build-Transfer-Operate”/ “BTO” 
model, where the title transfers to the government upon completion of the 
construction phase of the project;  within the “Build-Own-Operate”/ “BOO” 
framework, the private sector retains permanent ownership and operates the facility 
on contract). 
 
By the same token, it is difficult to discern any clear relationship, hierarchical or 
lateral, between the privatization and liberalization efforts in Hong Kong, although 
there may be a common strategic denominator.  The deregulation of the 
telecommunications industry remains virtually the sole example of a major revamping 
of a key segment of private sector activity with a view to exposing it to competitive 
forces (and, by implication, rendering it more responsive to consumer demand).  
Electric utilities are the next target of a similar face-lift, given the potential for 
effective decoupling of production (where economies of scale no longer play a crucial 
role) from distribution (where “natural” monopolies are likely to be the norm for 
some time to come).  Other important industries, such as port facilities/container 
handling services and property development, have not even reached that stage.  As 
stated earlier, Hong Kong may be regarded as a beacon of free enterprise, from a 
comparative perspective, but there is arguably considerable scope for further 
liberalization in parts of the private sector marked by a high concentration of 
economic power. 
 
This observation applies with fewer qualifications to the public sector.  Modest 
experiments with contracting in do not really amount to a meaningful institutional 
redesign geared toward promoting competition.  The emergence of semi-autonomous 
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“authorities” (in addition to the Airport Authority and Hospital Authority, referred to 
previously, the Housing Authority is worth mentioning) cannot be overlooked.  Such 
forms of “devolved control” are apparently conducive to efficiency and thus 
consistent with the pursuit of consumer-responsive government.  However, it is 
interesting to note that, unlike in other countries, notably the United Kingdom, no 
full-fledged “internal markets” have been introduced in areas such as health care (an 
internal market involves three principal features: the creation of explicit and separate 
roles for purchasing and supply of services; the establishment of internal quasi-
contracts and trading arrangements between these separate roles; and the development 
of accounting and charging systems; Walsh 1995). 
 
Ultimately, liberalization in the public sector aims at “reinventing government” / 
“banishing bureaucracy” (Osborne and Gaebler 1993; Osborne and Plastrik 1997).  
Some of the goals are familiar, even if they are articulated in non-microeconomic 
terms:  Competitive government, customer-driven government, enterprising 
government, market-oriented government, mission-driven government and results-
oriented government.  Other terms have wider connotations than those commonly 
encountered in the political economy literature:  anticipatory government (emphasizes 
prevention rather than cure), catalytic government (separates “steering” / policy & 
regulatory from “rowing” / service delivery & compliance functions), community-
oriented government (empowering rather than serving), and decentralizing 
government (favoring participation & teamwork over hierarchy).  There is no 
evidence that this is the overall direction in which liberalization is progressing in 
Hong Kong. 
 
The divestiture by the public sector of a particular asset may follow a number of 
routes (Mayer and Meadowcroft 1985; Bailey 1995; Bailey 1999; Bailey 2004).  
Public floatation on the Stock Exchange is often resorted to.  A trade sale (where the 
asset is acquired by a single firm or consortium) and a placement (with a group of 
investors) are other frequently used divestiture methods.  A management or employee 
buyout is also occasionally relied upon.  An alternative to an asset sale is a long-term 
lease (where, instead of transferring an asset’s title to a private party via a sale, the 
government leases or “rents” the facility to a private party for a specified number of 
years; payment, maintenance, and operational requirements are spelled out in the 
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lease agreement; at the expiration of the lease, the government has the right to resume 
full control of the facility; such an arrangement should not be confused with a 
franchise, or the granting of an exclusive right to a private party to provide a service 
within a certain geographical area). 
 
A new privatization technique is a public-private asset swap, which features an 
exchange of an asset currently held by the government either for a comparable asset 
or for an agreement by the private party to develop a comparable asset (in such 
circumstances, governments swap valuable assets which they cannot utilize fully for 
facilities that are sufficient for public purposes).  Value capture transactions have had 
a longer history, but they have until recently not been taken advantage of on a large 
scale.  They normally allow the government to capture the value realized following 
the completion of an infrastructure project (by insisting on up-front concession 
payments or commitments based on the projected future value to be realized by the 
private party; by sharing directly in the property appreciation as it is realized by the 
private party after the project comes to fruition; by establishing tax increment or 
special-assessment districts).  A typical example would be property adjacent to a road 
that opens up development opportunities. 
 
Governments may also opt for “self-help,” which involves the transfer of an asset to a 
non-profit organization (e.g., community groups or neighborhood organizations may 
assume control over a local park).  They may take this notion further and seek the 
assistance of volunteers in the provision of services.  Last but not least, governments 
may simply cease exercising responsibility for a certain function, paving way for an 
entry by a private party, which is known as “commercialization” or “service 
shedding.”  Again, a rather narrow range of privatization methods has been observed 
in Hong Kong.  Public floatations have been the dominant element in the picture and 
long-term leases have been the technique of choice for land sales.  Asset swaps are 
virtually unheard of, genuine value capture transactions are a rare phenomenon, and 
so are self-help, volunteer programs and commercialization / service shedding.  
Divestitures are seldom undertaken through trade sales, placements, or management / 
employee buyouts. 
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Popular impressions notwithstanding, the effects of privatization are multi-
dimensional in nature (Table 3).  Public examination of the issue often focuses on 
short-term/static efficiency rather than that of the long-term/dynamic variety.  There is 
also a tendency to accord much greater attention to technical, as distinct from 
allocative, efficiency (the former emphasizes the desirability of providing the output 
demanded by consumers at the lowest possible cost, subject to the technical 
constraints of production; the underlying assumption is that one cannot redeploy the 
inputs and obtain more output of one good without reducing the output of another; the 
input configuration is thus efficient; the latter requires that firms generate the level, 
mix, and quality of output at a price where it is not possible to realign the outputs of 
the economy and make one consumer better off without making another worse off; 
the corollary is that all potential gains from trade need to be exhausted).  A lack of 
balance between technical and allocative efficiency may lead to policies geared 
toward cost-cutting rather than ones seeking a closer fit between prices and costs 
(Jackson and Price 1994). 
 
The “short-termism” exhibited in addressing efficiency concerns reflects this 
syndrome and compounds the problem.  It manifests itself in the preoccupation with 
the narrow question of ownership, or the most optimal short-term utilization of 
productive resources.  This is the issue of static efficiency.  However, beyond such a 
limited time horizon, the effectiveness of investment in new productive capacity, or 
dynamic efficiency, must duly be taken into consideration.  Specifically, from a long-
term perspective, efficiency cannot be achieved unless new investments are based on 
“correct” prices and the transfer of property rights from the public to the private sector 
in its various forms must be predicated on this notion.  The implication is that 
privatization should be conceived as a process involving a wide array of institutional 
reforms rather than merely the change of ownership over assets.  This is 
acknowledged in the academic/professional literature, albeit by no means adequately, 
but is often overlooked in practice (Jackson and Price). 
 
The argument for conceptualizing privatization broadly, rather than in conventional 
(i.e., narrow) terms, was put forward earlier in the paper.  In relation to dynamic 
efficiency, it is important to stress not the desirability of a comprehensive institutional 
overhaul per se, but the significance of strategies designed to enhance the 
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effectiveness of the functioning of the price mechanism, where appropriate.  The 
process of implementing such strategies is an extended and multi-faceted one.  It 
normally precedes specific privatization projects and features a systematic effort to 
come to grips with the pricing of public output (i.e., proper use of user charges and 
fees; Ott and Harley 1991; Adam, Cavendish, and Mistry 1992; Jackson and Price 
1994; Bailey 1995; Bailey 1999; Dollery and Wallis 2001; Bailey 2004). 
 
Efficiency, whether technical or allocative, static or dynamic, should not be the sole 
factor driving policy decisions.  Distributive justice is another crucial element in the 
picture (Table 3).  As Okun (1975) has aptly pointed out, there is often a trade-off 
between efficiency and equity and the strategic balancing act may pose serious 
challenges in a moderate/slow growth environment.  One cannot avoid the issue of the 
impact of privatization on the short-term distribution of income.  Perhaps more 
fundamentally, especially if pursued consistently and on a large-scale, privatization 
may affect materially the distribution of wealth by inducing shifts in the structure of 
property rights and corresponding changes in entitlement to income (Jackson and 
Price 1994). 
 
By the same token, macroeconomic variables such as growth, inflation, and 
unemployment are inevitably influenced by institutional re-engineering in general and 
deep changes in intersectoral relationships in particular (Table 3).  To the extent that 
the revenues generated via privatization are employed to repay debt, replace tax 
revenues, or are offset against new borrowing, then this can have tangible 
macroeconomic consequences over the short term.  Looking farther, it is questions of 
structural adjustment that loom large on the policy agenda.  The crux of the matter 
obviously is whether privatization facilitates or hinders responses to internal and 
external shocks.  This is an essential consideration for policy makers in an open 
economy setting (Siebert 1992; Jackson and Price 1994; Giersch 1997; Schipke 
2001). 
 
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
 
The repercussions of privatization are not invariably favorable from a public interest 
perspective.  The effects on distributive justice require careful scrutiny in most 
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circumstances.  In recent years, a modest intellectual backlash against the 
phenomenon has been witnessed and it has become selectively “fashionable” to 
question its benefits widely rather than just express mild concerns about the impact on 
the distribution of income and wealth (Nonneman 1996; Feigenbaum, Henig, and 
Hamnett 1998; Letza, Smallman, and Sun 2004).  The attempts at “deconstruction” 
cannot be portrayed as entirely successful and the case for privatization on traditional 
grounds (efficiency and macroeconomic stabilization) remains largely intact, other 
things being equal.  Nevertheless, the issue of distributive justice needs to be 
addressed earnestly in specific contexts, if the nature and scope of the undertaking 
merits such a stance, and the more concrete benefits should never be taken for 
granted.  One does not have to side instinctively with the critics, but there is enough 
ambiguity in the relevant data to suggest that privatization should normally be 
approached with a “constructively sceptical” mindset (Jackson and Price 1994; Bailey 
1995; Bailey 1999; Bailey 2004). 
 
In Hong Kong, the focus has been mostly on technical/static efficiency and short-term 
stabilization.  Dynamic efficiency has not been overlooked altogether in that the 
government has generally endeavored to promote competition in areas where 
privatization has been pursued in a meaningful fashion, transport being a case in 
point.  Be that as it may, the pricing of services, before and following privatization, 
has not been handled in a systematic manner and progress toward a comprehensive 
competition policy has been painfully slow.  Nor have modern regulatory structures 
been established across-the-board to insure that dynamic efficiency can be attained 
consistently over time (Mushkat and Mushkat 2005c).  Such structures also have a 
role to play in contributing to long-term macroeconomic stabilization, a goal that has 
not been incorporated explicitly into the privatization agenda and whose full 
realization probably requires a bolder (in terms of breadth, depth, and pace) strategy 
of public sector liberalization. 
 
Issues of distributive justice have been accorded scant attention, other than in relation 
to housing.  This is hardly surprising as Hong Kong fits the paradigm of a “neoliberal 
state” (Suleiman and Waterbury 1990; Clarke and Pitelis 1993; Nonneman 1996; 
Feigenbaum, Henig, and Hamnett 1998). Its modus operandi reflects the assumption 
that the ultimate aim of development – eradication of poverty and improved welfare – 
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is best achieved through economic growth and that in order to enjoy healthy economic 
growth it is preferable to rely on free-market forces than on state intervention.  
However, it should be noted that other neoliberal states, although perhaps less 
unequivocally so, are not altogether oblivious to the distributional consequences of 
individual projects or set of projects.  Another point worth noting in this context is 
that there has been virtually no criticism, whether general or specific, of privatization 
in Hong Kong.  Notwithstanding the putative merits of “rolling back the frontiers of 
the state,” this is an undesirable state of affairs in that it might breed complacency, 
lead to policy mistakes, and prevent decision makers from identifying (where 
appropriate) alternatives to traditional-style divestitures.  
 
Academic students of the phenomenon have recently ventured beyond the descriptive 
and normative aspects of privatization and have explored it widely from a political 
angle.  The writings of public choice theorists stand out in this respect.  They argue 
compellingly that one can neither fully understand the privatization dynamics nor 
offer effective institutional prescriptions without acknowledging that actors involved 
in the process are driven to a considerable extent by their own interests rather than 
engaged altruistically in a quest to maximize the welfare of the community-at-large.  
This manifest itself throughout the political arena, including the executive/ 
bureaucratic and legislative arms of government, rather than merely in the peculiar 
domain of pressure group activity (Caves 1990; Suleiman and Waterbury 1990; 
Clarke and Pitelis 1993; Giersch 1997; Feigenbaum, Henig, and Hamnett 1998). 
 
The public choice factor does not feature meaningfully in discussions of privatization 
in Hong Kong, even at the academic level.  The oversight does not imply that it is 
irrelevant.  For instance, the territory’s two most senior public officials asserted, in an 
informal exchange on the subject with one of the authors, that a major impediment to 
speedy privatization of government departments and equivalent is the stiff resistance 
by employees.  The corollary, from a public choice standpoint, is that the latter may 
have “captured” the organizational units in question.  Special interest resistance, 
which may fall short of capture, comes into play in other forms as well (Mushkat and 
Mushkat 2003; Mushkat and Mushkat 2005a).  It may be possible to minimize the 
difficulties to which this apparently gives rise by opting for less threatening (to 
employees) forms of privatization (e.g., public-private partnerships) and redesigning 
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key parts of the institutional architecture (e.g., establishing autonomous/”apolitical” 
regulatory bodies).  Clearly, however, the problem has to be diagnosed properly first. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Unlike many countries – notably India, Japan, and Taiwan in the region that it serves 
as a provider of intermediary services – Hong Kong does not have to confront the 
privatization challenge with a sense of urgency.  While its government may not be the 
self-restrained peripheral player affectionately depicted by some commentators 
enamored with its supposedly unshakable devotion to capitalist principles, it 
nevertheless continues to act principally as a modest-size facilitator of private sector 
initiative in an open and flexible economic environment.  This is certainly the case by 
international standards.  Moreover, Hong Kong is in the fortunate position to have 
accumulated substantial fiscal surpluses, which have not been depleted seriously 
during the “lean years” following the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis.  The robust 
recovery that has coincided with the post-2003 global upturn and the adoption of 
various Hong Kong-friendly measures by the central government in Beijing has 
propelled the fiscal balance firmly into positive territory.  Hong Kong may thus 
“muddle through” comfortably on the privatization front. 
 
That said, the argument cannot be stretched too far.  The strength of the current 
upswing reflects, albeit not exclusively, special cyclical factors whose influence may 
not prove long-lasting.  As a mature, service-based economy, Hong Kong is destined 
to expand at a more moderate rate than witnessed at the mid-point of the present 
decade.  Demographic constraints, not addressed so far imaginatively and vigorously 
by the government, may turn out to be another strong headwind in this respect.  The 
potentially fragile public revenue system, which has outlived its usefulness but has 
remained reform-proof in the face of rhetoric signaling its imminent demise, may not 
be able to withstand the pressures unleashed by such socio-economic forces and 
institutional rigidities.  Privatization is not a panacea, but it may provide some relief at 
delicate junctures and reinvigorate the supply-side of the economy in the long run, 
rendering it more resilient and less vulnerable from a fiscal perspective. 
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The relationship between privatization and the development of civil society also 
should not be overlooked.  In the appropriate circumstances, the former may help to 
revitalize the latter (Suleiman and Waterbury 1990; Clarke and Pitelis 1993; 
Nonneman 1996; Feigenbaum, Henig, and Hamnett 1998).  The reason lies in the fact 
that privatization is, by definition, an antidote to the “nanny state.”  If pursued 
consistently, on a sufficiently large scale, and in a way that displays sensitivity toward 
questions of distributive justice, it may encourage communities to become more self-
relient and less dependent on government direction.  A flatter and more decentralized 
bureaucratic structure, conducive to the growth of civil society, is another possible 
byproduct of privatization.  Hong Kong offers an interesting mixture of private 
(individual and corporate) initiative and generally well-functioning government 
infrastructure, but without a vibrant civil society acting as a bridge between the two 
(Lo 2002).  Privatization could arguably contribute indirectly to the strengthening of 
this fledgling component. 
 
Our analysis suggests that the performance may not match the promise.  Hong Kong 
may qualify as a model neoliberal state, from a comparative standpoint, but it is 
hardly an aggressively reforming one.  The type of radical institutional restructuring 
observed elsewhere (Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and the United States) 
at various junctures is not likely to be contemplated, let alone followed in practice.  
One senses a satisfaction with the status quo and a preference for “swimming with the 
tide” produced by vested interests rather than leaning against it.  Moreover, deep and 
rapid reforms may not be easy to undertake in the post-1997 political setting.  The 
prevalence of external (China) and internal (institutional fragmentation and lack of 
grass-roots support) constraints militates against decisive action (Scott 2000; Lo 2002; 
Burns 2004; Scott 2005). 
 
The handling of privatization also seems to expose some inherent weaknesses of 
government policy making.  The task has obviously not been addressed in a “rational-
comprehensive” fashion.  Indeed, there is no compelling evidence to indicate that it 
has even been managed in accordance with the “disjointed incrementalism” model of 
organizational problem solving (unless the disjointed element of the formula is 
allowed to dominate the incremental one).  As stated earlier, the government is 
committed to privatization as a strategic goal and, to paraphrase Kingdon (2002), 
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when an appropriate “window” opens, or the opportunity presents itself, it moves 
forward.  However, the movement does not appear driven by a coherent vision and to 
be orchestrated in a logically consistent manner.  Quite the contrary, the experience 
conjures up images of Kingdon’s (2002) “garbage can model,” which likens public 
decision making to actions of a magician who reaches inside a black hat and pulls out 
a rabbit. 
 
Specifically, the segment of the policy environment in which privatization choices are 
made may well resemble an “organized anarchy.”  The government seems to tackle 
one strategic item at a time, on an ad hoc basis, and without seeking inspiration from a 
thoroughly explored, carefully tested and wide-ranging blueprint.  As the recent 
proposal to integrate underground and overground rail services illustrates, there is no 
determined effort to arrive at the “best” configuration.  Rather, the relevant decision 
makers normally embrace an option that “satisfices,” or that is deemed to be “good 
enough” in the specific context in which it is considered.  The process probably does 
not display sufficient continuity/smoothness over time to qualify as a form of 
incrementalism (again, other than one of a distinctly disjointed variety). 
 
A rather striking feature of the situation is the narrow path followed in terms of the 
ends pursued, means adopted, linkages (between the two sets) identified, and 
variables explored.  While privatization can scarcely be portrayed as an unfamiliar 
problem, it is not necessarily a “well-structured” one.  It may at best qualify as a 
“moderately-structured” problem and may even have the attributes of the “ill-
structured” variant (Dunn 1994).  If this assumption is valid, policy analysts/managers 
should be engaged in “a never ending discourse with reality, to discover yet more 
facts, more dimensions of action, more opportunities for improvement” (Derry 1984: 
6-7).  This means pushing the “boundaries” of the problem rather than shrinking 
them.  The Hong Kong experience with privatization has arguably not conformed to 
that ideal, possibly depriving the community of institutional choices with the potential 
to enhance its welfare. 
 
Table 1 
The Payer-Provider Split 
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THE PROVIDER 
  Public Private 
 
THE PAYER 
Public 1 2 
Private 3 4 
 
 
Table 2 
Ownership and Market Structure 
 MARKETS 
  Monopoly Competitive 
 OWNERSHIP Public A B 
Private C D 
      
1. D is superior to A, where D represents private ownership and a competitive 
product market. 
2. D is superior to C reflecting the standard economic view which favors 
competition. 
3. D is equal to, or superior to, B. A review of the evidence suggests that under 
competition, private firms are likely to be superior to public sector firms. 
4. B is superior to A, reflecting the role of competition. 
5. C is superior A, reflecting in a non-competitive environment the policing role 
of private capital markets. 
6. B is superior, inferior or equal to C (inconclusive) depending on the relative 
strengths of competition and ownership. 
 
Table 3 
Economic Effects of Privatization     
  
 SHORT TERM LONG TERM 
 EFFICIENCY Static Efficiency Dynamic Efficiency 
 DISTRIBUTION Distribution of Income Distribution of Wealth 
 STABILIZATION Adjustments to Cyclical 
Fluctuations 
Structural Adjustments 
 
 23 
 
 
 
References 
 
Adam, C., W. Cavendish, and P.S. Mistry (1992) Adjusting Privatization (London: 
Currey). 
 
Anderson, T.L. and P.J. Hill (1996) The Privatization Process (Lanham: Rowman and 
Littlefield). 
 
Ash, R. et al. (2003) Hong Kong in Transition (London: Routledge Curzon). 
 
Bailey, S.J. (1995) Public Sector Economics (Basingstoke: Macmillan). 
 
Bailey, S.J. (1999) Local Government Economics (Basingstoke: Macmillan). 
 
Bailey, S.J. (2004) Strategic Public Finance (Basignstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). 
 
Baumol, W. J. (1967) Macroeconomics of unbalanced growth, American Economic 
Review, 57(3): pp. 415-426. 
 
Bird, R.M. (1971) Wagner’s “law” of expanding activity, Public Finance, 26(1): pp. 
1-26. 
 
Bollard, A.E. and R.A. Buckle (1987) Economic Liberalization in New Zeland 
(Wellington: Allen and Unwin). 
 
Bollard, A.E. (1992) New Zealand (San Francisco: ICS Press). 
 
Boston, J., et al (1991) Reshaping the State (Auckland: Oxford University Press). 
 
Brewer, B. and A. La Grange (2001) Reforming Public Housing in Hong Kong (Hong 
Kong: Department of Public and Social Administration, City University of Hong 
Kong). 
 
Burns, J.P. (2004) Government Capacity and the Hong Kong Civil Service (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press). 
 
Butler, S. (1991) Privatization for public purposes, in W.T. Gormely (Ed) 
Privatization and its Alternatives (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press): pp. 17-
24. 
 
Carter, D. (1965) Power in Washington (New York: Random House). 
 
Caves, R.E. (1990) Lessons from privatization in Britain, Journal of Economic 
Behavior and Organization, 13 (1): pp. 145-169. 
 
 24 
Cheek-Milby, K. (1995) A Legislature Comes of Age (Hong Kong: Oxford University 
Press). 
 
Chen, E.K.Y. (1984) The economic setting, in D.G. Lethbridge (Ed) The Business 
Environment in Hong Kong  (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press): pp. 1-51. 
 
Cheng, L.K. and R.Y.C. Wong (1997) Port Facilities and Container Handling 
Services (Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong Press). 
 
Cheng, L.K. and C. Wu (1998) Competition Policy and Regulation of Business (Hong 
Kong: City University of Hong Kong Press). 
 
Cheng, T.Y. (1982) The Economy of Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Far East Publications). 
 
Clarke, T. and C. Pitelis (1993) The Political Economy of Privatization (London: 
Routledge). 
 
Cobb, R.W. and C.E. Elder (1983) Participation in American Politics (Baltimore: 
John Hopkins University Press). 
 
de Mesquita, B.B., D. Newman, and A. Rabushka (1985) Forecasting Political Events 
(New Haven: Yale University Press). 
 
de Mesquita, B.B., D. Newman, and A. Rabushka (1996) Red Flag Over Hong Kong. 
(Chatham: Chatham House). 
 
Derry, D. (1984) Problem Definition in Policy Analysis (Lawrence: University Press 
of Kansas). 
 
Dollery, B.E. and J.L. Wallis (2001) The Political Economy of Local Government 
(Cheltenham: Elgar). 
 
Dunn, D.N. (1994) Public Policy Analysis (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall). 
 
Dye, T.R. and H. Ziegler (1981) The Irony of Democracy (Monterey: Brooks/Cole). 
 
Easton, B.H. (1989) The Making of Rogernomics (Auckland: Auckland University 
Press). 
 
Feigenbaum, H., J. Henig, and C. Hamnett (1999) Shrinking the State (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press). 
 
Giersch, H. (1997) Privatization at the End of the Century (Heidelberg: Springer). 
 
Hall, C. (1996) The Uncertain Hand (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press). 
 
Ho, H.C.Y. and L.C. Chau (1989) The Economic System of Hong Kong (Hong Kong: 
Asia Research Center). 
 
 25 
Ho, L.S. (1997) Health Care Delivery and Financing in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: 
City University of Hong Kong Press). 
 
Holland, M. and J. Boston (1990) The Fourth Labor Government (Auckland: Oxford 
University Press). 
 
Jackson, P.M., and C. Price (1994) Privatization and Regulation (Harlow: Longman). 
 
Jao, Y.C. (2001) The Asian Financial Crisis and the Ordeal of Hong Kong (Westport: 
Quorum Books. 
 
Kingdom, J.W. (2002) Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (New York: 
Longman). 
 
Kwong, J.A. (1990) Market Environmentalism (Hong Kong: Chinese University 
Press). 
 
Kwong, K.S. (1988) Toward Open Skies and Uncongested Airports (Hong Kong: 
Chinese University Press). 
 
Lam, P.L. (1997) Competition in Energy (Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong 
Press). 
 
Lam, P.L. and Y.C. Chan (1997) Privatizing Water and Sewage Services (Hong 
Kong: City University of Hong Kong Press). 
 
Lam, P.L. and S. Chan (2000) Competition in Hong Kong’s Gas Industry (Hong 
Kong: Chinese University Press). 
 
Lane, J.E. (2000) The Public Sector (London: Sage). 
 
Lethbridge, D. and S.H. Ng (2000) The Business Environment of Hong Kong (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press). 
 
Letza, S.R., C. Smallman, and X. Sun (2004) Reframing privatization, Policy 
Sciences, 37(2): pp. 159-183. 
 
Lo, S.H. (2002) Governing Hong Kong (New York: Nova Science). 
 
Mayer, C.P. and S.A. Meadowcroft (1985) Selling public assets, Fiscal Studies, 6(4): 
pp. 42-56. 
 
Meyer, D.R. (2000) Hong Kong as a Global Metropolis (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press). 
 
Mueller, M. (1991) International Telecommunications in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: 
Chinese University Press). 
 
Mushkat, M. (1990) The Economic Future of Hong Kong (Boulder: Rienner). 
 
 26 
Mushkat, M. and R. Mushkat (2003) The political economy of constitutional conflict 
in an externally-constrained environment, Journal of Malaysian and Comparative 
Law, 30 (1&2), pp. 15-36. 
 
Mushkat, M. and R. Mushkat (2004) The political economy of constitutional conflict 
in Hong Kong, Tilburg Foreign Law Review, 11 (2), pp. 756-781. 
 
Mushkat, M. and R. Mushkat (2005a) Conversationalism, constitutional economics, 
and bicameralism, Asian Journal of Political Science, 13(1), pp. 23-50. 
 
Mushkat, M. and R. Mushkat (2005b) The political economy of recasting the political 
debate in Hong Kong, International Journal of Applied Philosophy, 19(1), pp. 63-72. 
 
Mushkat, M. and R. Mushkat (2005c) The political economy of non-majoritarian 
institutions, Journal of East Asian Affairs, 29(1), pp. 143-164. 
 
Nonneman, G. (1996) Political and Economic Liberalization (Boulder: Rienner). 
 
Okun, A. (1975) Equality and Efficiency (Washington: Brookings Institution). 
 
Osborne, D. and T. Gaebler (1993) Reinventing Government (New York: Plume 
Books). 
 
Osborne, D. and P. Plastrik (1997) Banishing Bureaucracy (Reading:  Addison 
Wesley). 
 
Ott, A.F. and K. Hartley (1991) Privatization and Economic Efficiency (Aldershot: 
Elgar). 
 
Peacock, A.T. and J. Wiseman (1961) The Growth of Public Expenditure in the 
United Kingdom (Princeton: Princeton University Press). 
 
Peebles, G. (1988) Hong Kong’s Economy (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
 
Rabushka, A. (1973) The Changing Face of Hong Kong (Washington: American 
Enterprise Institute). 
 
Rabushka, A. (1976) Value for Money (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press). 
 
Rabushka, A. (1979) Hong Kong (Chicago: Chicago University Press). 
 
Schipke, A. (2001) Why Governments Divest? (Berlin: Springer-Verlag). 
 
Scott, I. and J.P. Burns (1988) The Hong Kong Civil Service (Hong Kong: Oxford 
University Press). 
 
Scott, I. (2000) The disarticulation of Hong Kong’s post-handover political system, 
China Journal, 22(43), pp. 29-53. 
 
 27 
Scott, I. (2005) Public Administration in Hong Kong (Singapore: Marshall 
Cavendish). 
 
Siebert, H. (1992) Privatization (Tubingen: Mohr). 
 
Suleiman, E.N. and J. Waterbury (1990) The Political Economy of Public Sector 
Reform and Privatization (Boulder: Westview Press). 
 
Sung, Y.W. (1991) The China-Hong Kong Connection (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press). 
 
Sung, Y.W. (2002) The Emergence of Greater China (Basingstoke: Palgrave). 
 
Walsh, K (1995) Public Services and Market Mechanisms (Basingstoke: Macmillan). 
 
Wong, R.Y.C. (1998) On Privatizing Public Housing (Hong Kong: City University of 
Hong Kong Press). 
 
Woronoff, J. (1980) Hong Kong (Hong Kong:  Heinemann). 
 
Youngson, A.J. (1982) Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
